This article will assess some algorithmic models of social behavior for understanding religiosity and look for ways of applying such models to the emergence of early Christian religion. I will be operating especially within the theoretical framework of distributed, selforganizing, and dynamical systems.
What are distributed, dynamical systems? What is distributed knowledge?
In distributed systems, the behavior of the system is not centrally regulated; it rather emerges from the behavior of its individual parts. In other words, such systems are "self-organized" (cf. Resnick 1994; Clark 2001: 103-119) . Originally the theory of "dynamical systems," or simply "systems theory," made use of differential equations to describe changes in complex, non-linear systems, the behavior of which cannot be explained as the sum of the behavior of their parts (e.g., Mainzer 1997; van Leeuwen 2005) . Although the distributed systems discussed in this article can also be examined from the point of view of classical systems theory, we call our systems "dynamical" primarily in the sense that their state is determined in every single moment through the interaction of their parts. Instead of looking for equations that describe the overall behavior of the system, we will focus on the elementary interactions among its parts. Knowledge in such a system is distributed: the parts obtain and store information about their environment and react accordingly. There is no central agent receiving information from the individual parts and deciding about their behavior. Finally, such systems can also be characterized as "stochastic:" whereas the interactions among their elements can in principle be described by deterministic rules, their behavior on the whole is random.
Let us consider a few examples of simple distributed systems. Craig Reynolds (1987) simulated flocks of bird-like objects he baptized "boids" (from "bird-oids") using computer modeling. Each individual in the flock follows three simple rules of behavior. The rules are, in a decreasing order of priority (Reynolds 1987: 28): (1) Collision Avoidance: avoid collisions with nearby flockmates (2) Velocity Matching: attempt to match velocity with nearby flockmates (3) Flock Centering: attempt to stay close to nearby flockmates If we launch the system after assigning each boid a randomly chosen initial position and speed, after a short while a collective behavior emerges on the screen (Reynolds 2001) . Reynolds (1987: 30) calls this an "eagerness" to participate in a flock-like motion. The same algorithm can be used to simulate the motion of schools of fish and herds.
In the boid model, the flock will reach a steady state ("relaxation") after a while, which is the result of a trade-off among the different constraints governing its behavior. The more variegated behavior of real flocks, Reynolds argues (1987: 31) , is due to their interaction with the environment. In other words, realistic flock behavior involves "agentagent" as well as "agent-environment" interactions. By adding obstacles to the simulation and a "steer-to-avoid" mechanism to the boids, the flock shows a particularly graceful obstacleavoiding behavior. A nice example can be seen in the Disney movie "The Lion King" (1994) , where a wildebeest stampede was animated using a similar flocking algorithm (Tiemann 1994; Reynolds 2001 ). Obstacles are not necessarily fixed in space. For example, in the "Cool School" model (Hooper 1999 ) a school of fish realistically attempts to avoid a whale as well as a number of smaller predator fish.
The behavior of a group of people can also be modeled using a flocking algorithm. Reynolds suggests (1987: 32 ) that the boids model could be used to simulate traffic patterns.
Jessica Hodgins and her collaborators at the Georgia Institute of Technology have created various simulations of human motion, including groups of bikers avoiding an obstacle or riding through a bend (Brogan and Hodgins 1997; Hodgins 1998) . The school of Tamás Vicsek at Eötvös University (Budapest) and Collegium Budapest modeled various types of group behavior (Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek 2000; Farkas, Helbing, and Vicsek 2002) . One of their models exemplifies the significance of distributed approaches for the study of critical real-life problems. Understanding the motion of crowds in corridors and fire escapes is crucial for the design of public buildings. For some two decades, various mathematical tools have been tested to model the motion of large crowds, none of which, however, yielded a satisfying solution (Helbing et al. 2001) . Models based on the collective behavior of fluid and gas particles have already signaled a move toward a systems-theoretical approach. Yet a real breakthrough was achieved when scholars turned to the distributed paradigm, concentrating on the rules governing individual pedestrian motion. Dirk Helbing and his collaborators (Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek 2000) used "flocking" rules to model the flow of crowds in panic situations. They have successfully simulated the deadly effects of impatience and herding when passing through fire-exits, the build-up of clogs at doors as well as in widenings (!), and the usefulness of pillars that prevent the formation of bottle-necks. Again, the overall behavior of these models emerged from the simple rules governing the individuals rather than from equations describing the whole, as was usual with earlier approaches.
Whereas research on flocking has yielded perhaps the most spectacular distributed simulations, there are also many other kinds of distributed models that have been developed in the past few decades. A particularly fruitful field of study has been the modeling of ant and termite societies. Following simple rules of behavior, ants collect food and termites build nests (Resninck 1994: 59-68, 75-81; cf. Nicolis and Prigogine 1989: 232-38; Mainzer 1997: 107-12) . Mitchel Resninck (1987) has developed the very approachable StarLogo programming environment, in which various types of group behavior involving agent-agent and agent-environment interactions can be modeled. In connection with collective ant and termite behavior, we have to mention the field of ant robotics: instead of running computer simulations, these distributed models employ several robots that cooperate following simple behavioral rules (e.g. Wagner and Bruckstein 2001) . For example, robot ants cluster around food, follow a leader, and play tag (www.ai.mit.edu/projects/ants). In such models, complex interactions occur between agents as well as between agents and the environment. There is no single centralized mechanism behind the phenomena: algorithms govern the individuals from whose behavior ant society as a whole emerges.
The examples have given us a taste of the potential of distributed models to produce spectacular group behaviors. But how is this all related to religion? In the next section of the article I will give an overview of the directions of the cognitive, empirically oriented study of religion and highlight issues that particularly invite the use of distributed models.
The need for a distributed, dynamical systems approach in the Cognitive Science of Religion
Recent cognitive studies of religion have focused on four elements: religious experience, beliefs, texts and rituals. I will describe a model uniting the four elements ( Fig. 1 ) and suggest that a distributed, dynamical systems perspective can substantially enhance our understanding of religion in all four areas.
Figure 1
Religion as a system of four components Religious experience has been studied in the lab for decades (Wulff 1997: 169-204; Hood 2001; Livingston 2005 Religious experience seldom occurs spontaneously. A look at real-life religious systems shows that they induce as well as explain subjective experience. They elicit experience using techniques such as fasting, deprivation, music, dance, prayer, meditation, mass events, pilgrimage, architecture, art, and drugs. They also provide means to interpret (as well as anticipate) such experience, for example, as spiritual possession, journey of the soul, conversion, or works of the Holy Spirit. One component of the success of Early Christianity was probably the efficiency with which it engaged religious experience and interpreted it, for example, as gifts of the Spirit, conversion, or dying and rising with Christ.
Belief system
We can thus safely assume that religious beliefs are needed for experience to be conceived of as religious. Simple beliefs can be studied on animal models. The simplest ways to learn about environmental clues are habituation and sensitization (Squire and Kandel 2003 [1999]: 24-28, 48-50; Eichenbaum 2002: 41-46) . In habituation, the animal learns about the properties of a benign or unimportant stimulus that can be ignored; in sensitization, the animal learns about the properties of a harmful or threatening stimulus, and responds more vigorously to a variety of other stimuli as well (e.g., for some minutes after hearing a gunshot we will jump at hearing any noise). Sensitization and habituation are forms of non-associative learning. To associate two stimuli requires a more complex form of learning called classical conditioning (Squire and Kandel 2003 [1999]: 57-59; Eichenbaum 2002: 46-48) . In operant conditioning, the subject learns about the relationship of a stimulus to the subject's behavior.
For example, an animal learns to associate pressing a bar or a key with the delivery of food.
Animals are also capable of learning from each other, which results in simple forms of cultural transmission (Hauser 2000: 115-40 specialized to human beings". His conclusion is rather straightforward: "Ghosts come from within, not without." Notwithstanding these opinions, we have good reasons to assign cultural transmission an important role in the survival and stability of religious concepts and rituals (see below). Whereas the mental representation of religious ideas is to some degree explained by the theory of counter-intuitiveness (Boyer 1994 and , a major challenge is to understand how ideas such as "omniscient god" or "eternal life" are mentally represented.
While the latter concepts, indeed, violate ontological expectations, both of them involve a cognitive element ("omniscient" and "eternal," respectively) that is not explained (in fact, not even addressed) by the theory of counter-intuitiveness. The solution might be recursion (Czachesz forthcoming b), which Marc Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and W. Techumseh Fitch (2002) suggest is the only uniquely human feature of the language capacity. By recursion, we may be able to think about "knowledge" and "life" as being infinite. For example, some people know more than others, but some know even more: recursion enables us to infinitely re-apply this relation upon itself, until we arrive at the concept of "omniscience."
It has been proposed that supernatural beings are especially important in most religions. These beliefs seem to make use of various archaic mental structures (Boyer 2001: 171-77, 376 
Rituals
Rituals utilize the material culture of religion (such as texts, art, and music) and elicit religious experience. Rituals also play an important role in the generation and fixation of religious beliefs by repetition. There are two major cognitive theories of ritual. Harvey Whitehouse (1995; 2004) has proposed the "modes of religiosity" theory which makes a distinction between "imagistic" and "doctrinal" forms of religion and establishes a connection between the sensory stimulation in a ritual and the ritual's performance frequency, connecting to them a number of other psychological and social variables. Robert McCauley and Thomas Lawson (2002) , drawing on their ground-breaking study from 1990 (Lawson and McCauley 1990) , put forward the "ritual form hypothesis," according to which both performance frequency and sensory stimulation are functions of how the role of supernatural agents is conceptualized in the ritual.
In terms of my religious systems model, the fixation of beliefs occurs by simultaneously generating religious experience and exposing believers to external representations such as art, music, hymns, and texts. Rituals, as I will argue below, may arise from simple behaviors, such as operant conditioning and flocking. Rituals, in conclusion, can be also described as dynamical systems driven by interactions between agents and the environment (ritual space and artifacts) as well as interactions among agents.
Two types of distributed systems in religion
In sum, we need a distributed systems approach in the study of religion for several reasons.
Religion emerges from the interaction of a great number of participants with each other and their environment. Rituals are repetitive actions that emerge from these interactions. Texts (public representations) are environmental components that have been formed by the agents.
Beliefs and experiences are generated by texts and rituals and describe the internal states of the agents. On a different level, however, also beliefs and experiences can be studied as distributed phenomena, inasmuch as they are emerging from the interaction of different parts within the human mind.
Although we have been mainly using the "flocking" paradigm in this article (due to its intuitive and approachable character), we have to notice that there are also other kinds of Rituals involving a small number of objects and participants may be also approached from this perspective. Belief systems may be excellent candidates to be studied from a distributed perspective in either sense (cf. Pinker 2005) .
Finally, the model of religion that I have been outlining in this section can also be approached as a distributed system, particularly in the sense of "unprogrammed functionality." Different components of religious systems engage in delicate interactions so that minor changes in the system can result in complex, unpredictable outcomes. The problem is remarkably similar to the issue of biological and cultural complexity (e.g. Oltvai and Barabási 2002; Denton 2004 ) and its detailed discussion must be postponed to another occasion.
Some applications of the distributed model to religion and early Christianity
In the third part of the article I will apply the distributed systems approach to various aspects of religion. I will primarily talk about religion in terms of the four components that I have discussed in the previous section. Nevertheless, it must be realized that defining religion is not an easy task. The four elements in my model can be used to describe other domains of human behavior, as well. Health care may be an example, as shown in the following diagram (Fig. 2) .
To the four components that have been identified already in religious systems I added here references to social networks (top of the diagram) and the natural environment (bottom of the diagram). In this article I do not make an effort to solve this issue (see recently Day 2005) , but the solution might be that "religion" is a heuristic concept in the study of human behavior, which we will able to dismiss in the future. 
Natural environment:
• sources of pain / illness • substances for medicines some other species as well, can simulate the minds of other individuals even without a sensory input. Many children have imaginary playmates (Taylor 1999; recently Hoff 2005) .
Furthermore, we can handle people as real, of whom we read in novels or hear in epic narratives, even if we think they were made up by the writers.
The mental tool we are using to achieve this is the so-called "theory of mind" (Frith and Frith 2005) . The concept of the "theory of mind" has come under criticism recently (Leudar, Costall, and Francis 2004) and therefore it seems best to use it as a shorthand term for the above-mentioned abilities, rather than as a well-understood mental structure. At the base of this ability we probably find the mechanism of imitation (Brass and Hayes 2005; Byrne 2005 ), which occurs often without our knowledge or even against our will. One may think about the stickiness of yawning, well-known in other species as well. "Mirror neurons" are thought to be responsible for this and similar phenomena, although the exact mechanisms are largely unknown as yet (Rizzolatti et al. 2002) .
Whatever the neurological explanation may be, humans make simulations of the thoughts of other humans whom they do not see or hear, or even of other people they never knew. The organization of states relies on such mental abilities: leaders make assumptions of the behavior and reactions of their subjects and vice versa; large social groups are formed by individuals who never meet each other, or even never hear from each other. Wrong assumptions are often made, which in fact frequently results in social tension and unrest.
My suggestion is that religious ideas emerge as a necessary side-effect of the sophisticated "flocking rules" of human societies. The large-scale dynamics of human societies emerge as we make decisions based on interactions with our neighbors as well as on simulations of unknown, distant, and foreign human individuals. Some of the latter simulations are maintained in stabilized, stereotyped, and socially transmitted forms, such as national stereotypes. Ideas of religious agents are long-standing, stabilized, stereotyped, and socially transmitted simulations of distant or abstract persons. Religious agents, in fact, are often important family members, rulers, or distant, exotic people.
In terms of this hypothesis, there is little, if any, difference between abstract, distant social agents and religious ones. The major difference lies in the way secularized Western societies handle those ideas. However, in spite of this intended differentiation in Western societies, an appeal to ideas such as nation, social class, or monarch can evoke the same behavioral response as references to religious agents. In this framework it also makes perfect sense that in Melanesian religious imagination foreign investors are identified with the tribal ancestors (Whitehouse 1995) . In the framework of our flocking models, such ideas may be thought of as agents who follow the average behavior of a very large group of individuals. They may be imagined as "boids" with a very large mass and impetus. Individuals, in turn, adjust their behavior to those agents.
Elsewhere I have argued that the figure of Jesus in early Christian religion was extremely successful because it was shaped after the idea of ancestors, a widespread and attractive religious concept (Czachesz forthcoming a) . Jesus is very similar to us humans, except that he is free of body and is morally flawless. The frequent application of family metaphors to Jesus supports this reading. Relying on our arguments about the nature of religious ideas, we can add that Jesus' figure incorporates other widespread notions of abstract social agents inasmuch as he is thought about as Israel's Messiah and a monarch. I suggest that one of the major factors which enabled the formation of such a rich and flexible religious agent was the rapid as well as widespread circulation of the idea.
Networks
Although the work of Richard Dawkins and Dan Sperber have inspired much theorizing about the propagation of ideas, relatively little attention has been paid to a major factor in that process. I am referring here to social networks along which ideas (cultural bits) are transmitted. In the framework of distributed systems we can study also this phenomenon. We can use, for example, Uri Wilensky's NetLogo environment (Wilensky 2004) , which is based on Resninck's above-mentioned StarLogo, to experiment with the spread of messages in different social networks. In Wilensky's simple model, a message spreads in a society of randomly moving individuals ( Fig. 3 ; I have modified the colors for better visibility). When the simulation starts, only one agent is colored black, the one having the message. As other agents meet the "messenger," they turn black and become messengers themselves. The transmission of messages in real social networks is much more complicated than this. (1) First, not everyone is equally interested in a given message. (2) 
Spread of a message in NetLogo
Recently network theory has made tremendous advance in understanding the underlying common mechanisms of various natural and artificial networks (Barabási 2002; cf. Buchanan 2002) . Society can be easily modeled as a network, consisting of people and connections among them. A network can be described with a handful of parameters, such as its diameter (describing how quickly we get from someone to someone else on the network); its degree distribution (telling us whether there are very isolated or very popular individuals); and the strength of connections. This last feature was especially relevant for the spread of early Christianity (Czachesz forthcoming b) . Strong connections provide the backbone of networks and removing a few of them destroys the network structure: one may think of the royal family and its social connections in feudal societies. So-called weak links, in turn, can be removed in large numbers without immediate consequences; yet various observations about natural and social networks suggest that these connections have an important stabilizing effect (Csermely 2006) . Early Christians have created weak links in many different ways.
They invested into charity; they regularly entertained visitors, such as teachers, prophets, and other wandering Christians; finally, a great number of women joined the movement, which added to it an extra networking potential, as compared with, for example, the male society of the Mithras cult. The diverse weak links helped to preserve the unity of the manifold movement in spite of the various debates and tensions that existed from the very beginning (Luttikhuizen 2002) .
Rituals
Rituals are important locations for the generation of memories and for the reinforcement of existing ideas. Although this function of rituals has been appreciated (Lawson and McCauley 1990; Whitehouse 1995 Whitehouse , 2000 Whitehouse , 2004 McCauley & Lawson 2002) , less attention has been paid to the mechanisms shaping the rituals themselves (e.g., Hinde 1999; Boyer 2001) . I suggest that ritual may be approached as social behavior emerging in a distributed system. An interesting example is the so-called "Mexican wave" seen in football stadia (Farkas, Helbing, and Vicsek 2002) . A "Mexican wave" is a typical distributed behavior that emerges when a large number of spectators follow a few simple rules: when you see your second or third neighbor standing up, stand up yourself, raise your hands, and then sit down and lower your hands. Whether a wave emerges and spreads successfully, depends on how many spectators initiate it and where they sit in the stadium. Illés Farkas and his collaborators have successfully simulated the Mexican wave on the analogy of excitable media (Fig. 4) , a model originally created to describe processes such as forest fires or wave propagation in heart tissue. People are regarded as excitable units that can be activated by an external stimulus: a distance-and direction-weighted concentration of nearby active people. Once activated, each unit follows the same set of internal rules to pass through the active (standing and waving) and refractory (passive) phases before returning to its original resting (excitable) state. It has to be noticed that joint action often involves complementary rather than identical behavior (Sebanz, Bekkering, and Knoblich 2006) . However, synchronization spontaneously occurs even in such cases. Recent studies have shown that individuals working on mental tasks together non-consciously mimic each other's actions and synchronize rhythmical movements. Shall we replace the "theory of mind" with a "theory of body"? Do we synchronize our bodies so that we can read each other's minds? Communication experts have always warned us that our bodies tell more than our words. It seems that the long-standing interest in reading minds must be complemented (if not replaced) by a study of synchronizing bodies (cf. Gallese et al. 2004 ). Distributed models and rituals will occupy an important place in such a paradigm.
Innovations
The final issue to be mentioned is innovation. This is a very broad subject that is not exclusively related to religious behavior. In general, the success of the human species is largely dependent on its ability of inventing new forms of behavior and transmitting them without relying on genetic changes, which occur too slowly to follow fast changes in the environment (cf. Richerson and Boyd 2005) . Still the subject is highly relevant for the study of early Christianity, which emerged as a set of successful innovations in the belief system, rituals, and institutions of first century (Jewish) religion.
The social dynamics of innovation include experimentation and imitation (cf. Kameda and Daisuke 2003) . Individuals who experiment take a risk when they abandon the established ways of dealing with a situation. They may, however, sometimes find more efficient behaviors, and succeed where others fail. Still the majority is formed by so-called free-riders, who simply imitate the innovators. It is important that imitators do not only follow successful behavioral patterns, but also maladaptive ones. Any real-life society displays a balance of the two strategies, that is, innovation and free-riding. This can be excellently studied on a distributed model (Helbing, Farkas, and Vicsek 2000) . Dirk Helbing with his collaborators has designed a model to discover how a group consisting of innovators and freeriders can escape from a smoke-filled room. Innovators tried to find fire-exits randomly, whereas free-riders just followed the innovators. The simulations have shown that the group succeeds in leaving the room within the shortest time if it includes both innovators and freeriders.
The application of such a model to religious innovation is complicated by the fact that we do not know what the fire-exits stand for in a religious system, that is, we do not yet exactly know what makes religion successful. If religion is functional in human society, the doors may stand for some optimal social effects. Even if religion is not functional we may be able to identify certain attractors, that is, optimal and therefore long-standing forms, which are approached by religious experimentation. Optionally, religion may turn out to be a set of social behaviors which appear to the rationalist mind as strange and irrational, without being substantially different from other similar but more favorably received behaviors, as I have suggested above. In this case, the attractors may be looked for by studying interactions with distant and abstract social agents (such as dead persons, monarchs, or nation) in a distributed system. If we succeed in finding algorithmic or mathematical models of religious innovation, we may be also able to minimize the emergence of socially destructive religious systems as well as the destructive use of existing forms of religiosity.
Concluding remarks
A distributed systems approach bridges the gap between individual behavior and social phenomena. It helps to solve some fundamental difficulties of studying the social. Society has no behavior-individuals do; society has no knowledge-individuals do. Yet behavior and knowledge always present themselves as social realities. The same holds true for religion.
Finally, historians have the important task of supplying historical nuances to social theories and testing such theories against historical data. Religious systems and other social systems related to distant and invisible social agents may fulfill very different roles in different historical situations. Evolutionary approaches tend to bracket out historical differences as ones of secondary significance. For the student of the first century Mediterranean, the need for a historical perspective is obvious. Structurally similar social agents, such as ancestors, monarchs, nations, gods, and spirits, operate very differently at distant times and places. Therefore, the successful research strategy should integrate a systems-theoretical approach with well-informed historical differentiation.
